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Interpersonal Affect, Accountability and Experience in
Auditor Fraud Risk Judgments and the Processing of Fraud Cues

ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether auditors’ affect toward client management influences fraud
likelihood judgments and whether accountability and experience with fraud risk judgments
moderate this effect. This research also explores the process by which affect influences fraud
judgments by examining affect’s influence on the evaluation of fraud evidence cues. Results
indicate that more positive affect toward the client results in lower fraud likelihood judgments.
Accountability is found to moderate this effect, but only for experienced auditors. These findings
have implications for fraud brainstorming sessions where all staff levels provide input into fraud
risk assessments and because client characteristics are especially salient during these
assessments. Importantly, results also support the proposition that affect impacts inexperienced
auditors’ fraud assessments through errant attribution of client likeability to evidence cues that
refer to management, rather than biasing all client-related evaluations. Together, these findings
suggest that education and training can be improved to better differentiate relevant and irrelevant
cues in fraud judgment.

Keywords: accountability, affect, experience, fraud
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INTRODUCTION
“One cannot be introduced to a person without experiencing some
immediate feeling of attraction or repulsion and without gauging such
feelings on the part of the other. We evaluate each other constantly, we
evaluate each others’ behavior, and we evaluate the motives and the
consequences of their behavior” Zajonc (1980, p. 153).

One of the cornerstones of the audit profession is the objective evaluation of evidence
(Kinney 1999). A critical source of audit evidence comes from the interactions between auditors
and their clients (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2004). As discussed
by Bennett and Hatfield (2013), characteristics of the audit work environment, including client
management, have the potential to affect auditor behavior. Individuals have an automatic,
emotional evaluation of others, which has been shown to influence one’s interpretation of
subsequent facts and impressions (Regan et al. 1974, Fiske and Taylor 1991). Research has
shown that interpersonal affect influences financial decisions (Kida, Moreno, and Smith 2001,
Moreno, Kida and Smith 2002), juror judgments (Kadous 2001), and auditor judgments
(Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002, Bhattacharjee et al. 2012). Reviews of the auditing literature
note the dearth of research on how interpersonal relationships influence audit judgments (Nelson
and Tan 2005) and call for research examining the effect of task experience and/or other
interventions that may serve to minimize the effects of affect on auditor judgments
(Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2013). Further, there is little research on how affect may affect fraud
judgments even though client characteristics may be more salient in a fraud setting.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether interpersonal affect (client likeability)
impacts auditors’ assessments of fraud risk. Further, this study extends prior research by
examining two potential moderating factors, accountability and experience, which have been
shown to eliminate certain judgment biases (Kennedy 1993, Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002).
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Importantly, the professional standards require inclusion of inexperienced auditors in fraud
brainstorming discussions (AICPA 2002b). These professionals may be the most susceptible to
client affect (Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002), and they tend to have significant interactions with
clients (Bennett and Hatfield 2013). However, even those with general audit experience may not
have experience in assessing fraud risk. As discussed by Hammersley (2011), task experience
may be more useful than general audit experience in explaining effectiveness on fraud tasks.
Therefore, this study specifically examines the moderating influence of task experience
(experience with fraud risk assessments) on fraud risk judgments. Further, within the fraud risk
setting, interpersonal affect may be more salient since client factors (i.e. attitudes, honesty,
competence) need to be attended to in assessing management characteristics. Accountability is
particularly important in this case as it enables auditors to evaluate information more
systematically to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. Finally, this study
explores the process by which interpersonal affect impacts fraud judgments by examining how
client likeability influences the assessment of specific fraud evidence cues.
An experiment in which client likeability and accountability were manipulated was
conducted with professional auditors as participants. A self-report measure of direct fraud risk
experience was also collected. Auditors judged the likelihood of fraud for a company and then
assessed the extent to which ten evidence statements were indicative of fraud. Results indicate
that client likeability impacts overall fraud likelihood judgments with auditors assessing a higher
(lower) likelihood of fraud for dislikeable (likeable) clients. A three-way interaction indicates
that accountability mitigates this effect for the auditors who have relevant task experience.
Further, the paper finds differences in the manner in which experienced versus inexperienced
auditors assess independent fraud cue statements. Inexperienced auditors make errant attributions
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of likeability to the fraud cue statements that reflect management characteristics and attitudes,
while experienced auditors exhibit no affect bias in their assessments of the fraud cue statements.
This paper contributes to both practice and academia by providing a first step to
identifying the boundary conditions of the combination of experience and accountability on fraud
judgments. These findings provide support for the profession’s use of accountability tools
(requiring documentation/justification) to encourage effortful thought, but highlight the need for
task-specific knowledge in fraud judgments. Brainstorming and group discussions of fraud can
provide a venue for experiential training for inexperienced auditors to learn to distinguish
relevant from irrelevant information in their judgment process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper presents
the theory and hypotheses. The third section describes the experimental design. Finally, the last
two sections present the results and conclusions, and offer some directions for future research.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Evidence received from the client may be one of the most pervasive (Koonce 1992) and
cost-effective types of audit evidence (Wright and Mock (1985)). While evidence collected from
independent sources is considered more reliable, personnel within the client organization possess
valuable knowledge (Haynes 1999). In some instances, such as assessing client integrity and
competence, management may be the only practical source of evidence (Anderson and Marchant
1989; Anderson, Koonce and Marchant 1994). The auditing standards require auditors to conduct
interviews with client personnel pertaining to potential fraudulent activity, but they also require
the auditor to maintain professional skepticism “regardless of any past experience with the entity
and regardless of the auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity” (AICPA
2002b). Thus, both academic research and the professional literature recognize the importance of
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the auditor-client relationship and its influence on evidence evaluation, evidence reliability, and
professional skepticism.
Auditing research has investigated several characteristics of client personnel that are
relevant to auditing judgments, including competence (Hirst 1994; Bhattacharjee et al. 2012),
source reliability (Anderson et al. 1994), and “tone at the top” (Marden, Holstrom, and Schneider
1997). In the discussion of their results, Anderson et al. (1994) suggest that the social context of
the audit environment may contain some dimensions not captured in their experiment. The
auditor-client social context is an important aspect that has been largely neglected by research
(Waller 1989). Hoffman and Patton (1997) suggest the social interaction is immediate as auditors
begin forming impressions of the client during initial meetings. The auditors surveyed by
Gibbins and Wolf (1982) consistently rated client service matters and people involved in the
audit as important environmental factors for the auditor to consider. In fact, of the thirteen most
important factors identified, five were directly related to the social environment of the audit,
including references to personnel (client and auditor), client service, and client wishes. The
professional standards implicitly acknowledge this social context by cautioning the auditor to
maintain professional skepticism in client interactions despite any previous experience with the
client (AICPA 2002b). While some client characteristics (integrity, trust, competence) are
relevant to auditing judgments, client likeability (disposition) is an irrelevant factor for fraud
judgment.
Research finds that auditors do include some evidence that is not relevant in their
judgments, and that experience may moderate this effect. Hackenbrack (1992) provided auditor
participants with both evidence relevant to the experimental judgment and evidence relevant to
other aspects of the audit but not the judgment task. Hackenbrack suggests that auditors may
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include irrelevant information in judgments due to “similarity based inference processing.”
Similarity based inferences are based on evidence that is similar but not a substitute for relevant
evidence in a judgment.1. Hoffman and Patton (1997) argue that the professional guidance omits
the important hazard of auditors attending to irrelevant evidence in fraud judgments. The
discussion of professional skepticism in the standards suggests that client likeability (disposition)
should not be mistaken as a relevant cue, such as client integrity, in a fraud judgment. While a
few accounting studies have examined the impact of face-to-face human (affective) interaction in
audit judgments (i.e. Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002; Bhattacharjee et al. 2012), researchers
note the importance of, and need for, future research in this area (i.e. Nelson and Tan 2005;
Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2013). Further, fraud provides an important setting for the
examination of the influence of affect. Interpersonal affect cues may be more salient in this
environment as auditors assess management characteristics and attitudes in order to detect fraud
red flags.
Affect
The affective evaluation of others is automatic and immediate (Zajonc 1980). That is,
people immediately feel attraction or avoidance toward others. One way this affective evaluation
can impact future judgments is through errant attribution (e.g., Regan, Straus and Fazio 1974).
Attribution relates to the mental processes employed in a particular judgment used to draw causal
inferences (Fiske and Taylor 1991). For example, Regan et al. (1974) demonstrate that a simple
manipulation of likeability toward a target person in the introduction of a videotaped skill-test
impacts the overall skill rating of the target person. That is, a likeable (dislikeable) person will
receive higher (lower) skill rating despite demonstrating equivalent skill on a task. Specifically,
The term “similarity based inference” is consistent with judgment errors described as errant attribution. While
attribution is looking for a cause on an event (Hastie 1984), errant attribution is errantly attributing someone’s
behavior to disposition qualities rather than the appropriate factor (Fiske and Taylor 1991).
1
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the performance of a liked (disliked) target was attributed to the target’s ability when the
performance was good (bad), but attributed to external situational factors when the performance
was bad (good)2. Thus, auditors should be aware that client likeability established in an initial
client meeting may impact future judgments related to the client attributes, such as competence
and integrity, causing suboptimal fraud judgments.
Affect in Accounting
While accounting research finds that auditors develop an attitude toward evidence, which
may include an affective component (e.g., Bamber, Ramsay and Tubbs 1997), relatively little
research has specifically investigated affect in the judgments of accountants. Kida and Smith
(1995), Kida, Moreno, and Smith (2001), Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002), and Bhattacharjee et
al. (2012) are some notable exceptions.
Kida and Smith (1995) provide a theoretical model of cognitive processing that includes
affect, which was supported empirically in a study by Kida, Smith and Maletta (1998). Kida,
Moreno, and Smith (2001) examine the systematic impact of affect on accountants’ capital
budgeting decisions. Business managers reject capital budgeting projects that elicit negative
affect even though they have higher expected returns. This demonstrates that business managers
do not make judgments in a strictly rational economic manner. Instead, they include in their
judgment a cost or avoidance utility function associated with the negative affect of persons
related to the judgment.
Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) find that staff and seniors rate inventory obsolescence
risk assessments higher when they have negative affect toward the client than when no affective

2

The experimental task was to assess the skill of a student performing a skill test. Participants viewed a two-part
videotape including an introduction (likeability manipulation) and the target student performing the test. The current
research follows the Regan et al. (1974) protocol and is discussed further in the method section below.
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information is provided. Conversely, affect does not influence the judgments of managers and
partners. Their findings support the hypothesis that general audit experience may limit the impact
of negative affect toward a client during an audit judgment task. Bhattacharjee, Moreno and
Riley (2012) extend this research by examining whether affect influences auditors’ sensitivity to
client competence. They find that when client competence is low, auditors rate the risk of
obsolescence higher for dislikeable clients than likeable clients. However, the effect is eliminated
for high competence clients.
The current study extends the literature on affect toward the client to a fraud judgment
task. Fraud provides an important and distinct setting for the examination of the influence of
affect. Fraud continues to be a concern to the auditing profession with large resources being
devoted to litigation (See Hammersley 2011). Auditors must attend to specific client
characteristics as they assess fraud risk in their communications with management in order to
evaluate the client’s attitudes and assess whether the client may be concealing information.
These interpersonal interactions are potentially more susceptible to the influence of affect than
other general audit tasks. Auditing standards note the importance of fraud judgments and specify
that fraud discussions should continue throughout the audit (AICPA 2002, SAS 99). Although
client likeability should not be considered relevant evidence in fraud judgments, we expect that
since prior research has shown that affect toward the client has erroneously been included in
other accounting judgments, it will also be included in fraud judgments. On the other hand, since
fraud has serious implications for an audit client, it is possible that auditors use more systematic
(versus heuristic) thinking and are thus better able to exclude irrelevant information. Stated as a
testable hypothesis:
H1:

Positive (negative) affect toward a client will result in a lower (higher) overall
likelihood judgment of fraud.

8

Accountability and Experience as Moderators
Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2013) call for the examination of factors that may moderate
the impact of client likeability. This study examines accountability and fraud risk assessment
experience as potential moderating factors. Accountability has been shown to influence what
evidence the judge attends to and how that evidence is weighted (Tetlock 1992; Hirst 1992;
Messier and Quilliam 1992; Peecher 1996; Hoffman and Patton 1997). In practice, auditors are
held accountable to superiors, and are generally required to explain their judgments through
workpaper documentation.
The framework for accountability’s debiasing effect is that judges have available two
mental processes: heuristic/low effort (system 1 thinking) and systematic/high effort (system 2
thinking) to evaluate judgment criteria. High effort judges pay closer attention to the message
cues rather than environmental cues such as the person sending the message (Chaiken 1980). The
high accountable judge is motivated to balance efficient and effective processing based on the
audience preferences and demands (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Tetlock 1992). In this study we posit
that greater accountability will cause more effortful thinking, which will enable individuals to
exclude the irrelevant environmental cues (client affect) from their decision. An explicit
justification requirement is a common and salient accountability manipulation (e.g. DeZoort,
Harrison, and Taylor 2006; Agoglia, Kida, & Hanno, 2003) that has been shown to lead to more
complex and careful analysis of information. To vary accountability, participants in the high
(low) accountability condition will be informed of an explanation requirement for their judgment
before viewing the case materials (at the time of recording their judgment). Pre-knowledge of the
explanation requirement should lead to more effortful analysis of information (process
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accountability), whereas asking for an explanation at the time of the judgment should result in
lower accountability (outcome accountability). Formally stated:
H2: As accountability increases, the impact of affect toward the client on the overall
likelihood of fraud judgment will be reduced.
Accountability has been shown to reduce effort-related biases such as primacy (Tetlock
1983) and recency (Kennedy 1993) for individuals with relevant experience. Conversely for
those with less experience, accountability has been shown to exacerbate certain judgment biases
or result in less extreme judgments when the judgment environment includes irrelevant evidence
(Nisbett, Zukier and Lemley 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Kennedy
1995; Shelton 1999). Because accountability may induce effort-based thinking where knowledge
and experience are essential, this study also considers the auditor’s task experience. Knowledge
gained from experience can create knowledge structures that differentiate experienced auditors
from novices (Frederick 1991). Prior accounting research has considered differences in novices
and experienced professionals in making audit judgments (Bonner and Lewis 1990; Libby and
Frederick 1990; Bonner and Pennington 1991; Libby and Tan 1994; Bonner 1990; Shelton 1999;
Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2002). Shelton (1999) finds that auditors with less experience include
irrelevant evidence in a going concern judgment, but experienced audit partners do not use
irrelevant audit evidence in the going concern judgment. Similarly, Davis (1996) finds that more
experienced audit seniors attend to more relevant information than inexperienced audit seniors in
a control risk assessment task. In addition, he reports that the experiential knowledge of audit
seniors leads them to view fewer pieces of evidence, and make judgments in less time.
Specifically related to affect, Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) find that general audit experience
moderates the influence of affect on auditors’ risk assessments of inventory obsolescence.
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Auditor experience can be general or task-specific. While general audit experience is
relevant in many audit judgments, Hammersley (2011) points out that it is a noisy proxy for
fraud experience given the high variance of field experience with actual fraud among auditors.
That is, general audit experience does not ensure that an auditor has gained experiential fraud
knowledge. Thus, she suggests that fraud experience is a more useful measure for explaining
performance on fraud tasks. Hammersley further discusses the importance of measuring
experience with financial reporting fraud specifically. However, she notes two studies that find
the typical auditor has less than one encounter with financial reporting fraud. Since the setting in
the current study is a fraud risk assessment in the client acceptance/planning stage, the
experience measure chosen is a self report of whether the auditor has been “directly involved in
judging the likelihood that a firm may have material fraudulent financial reporting”.3 Although
lower ranking audit staff may have little experience in directly assessing fraud risk, they are an
important part of the fraud risk assessment process. SAS 99 requires audit teams to conduct
brainstorming sessions during the audit planning stage related to fraud, and all levels of
experience (rank and task experience) are expected to provide input. Thus in a fraud risk task, it
is important and relevant to determine whether experience has an effect on whether auditors are
susceptible to affect biases.
This research specifically examines the influence of task-specific-knowledge gained
through experience (Bonner 1990). Because auditors that have experience in direct assessment of
fraud risk have developed stronger knowledge structures of the fraud risk they are more apt to
select authoritative cues and objectively weight cues leading to a reduced impact of affect.

Participants were asked a debriefing question of “What proportion of these firms did have a material irregularity
(fraud in their financial statements)?” Consistent with other studies, partners with over 20 years of experience
reported encountering 0-2 actual material fraudulent misstatements.
3
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Therefore, it is expected that auditors who have fraud risk assessment experience will be less
likely to include client likeability in a fraud judgment. Formally stated:
H3: Fraud risk assessment experience will mitigate the impact of client affect on the
overall likelihood of fraud judgment.
Affect and Evidence Evaluation
A second focus of this paper is to explore the process by which affect toward the client
impacts fraud likelihood judgments. Client likeability could impact the overall judgment directly,
or it may impact fraud judgments indirectly through the auditor’s processing of the fraud
evidence cues that are more susceptible to attribution error.
Psychology research suggests that placing a stereotype or label on a person, such as
socioeconomic background, can impact all future judgments related to that person (e.g., Darley
and Gross 1983). Darley and Gross (1983) provide that individuals could maintain a predisposed
position when receiving future information by discounting inconsistent future information or
reinterpreting the valence of new information to maintain the predisposed position. Thus, the
predisposed like or dislike position leads to a global bias in the fraud judgment.
Conversely, affect can impact assessments of individual fraud statements through
attribution or errant attribution. That is, affect can influence certain types of related, but not
relevant, evidence in future evaluations (Regan et al. 1974). As Hackenbrack (1992) proposes,
individuals may use “similarity based inference” to link an irrelevant fact to an evaluation.
Regan et al. (1974) find that likeability of a target impacts the future skill rating of the target
person. Similarly, this research posits the auditors will link client likeability to the specific
evidence being interpreted. That is, a personal characteristic of client likeability may be
erroneously attributed to other characteristics or attitudes of the client, but it is less likely that
errant attribution will occur to non-personal evidence, such as industry competitiveness.
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Auditors who are experienced with fraud presumably possess the task-specific knowledge
to exclude client likeability in evidence assessments. Conversely, auditors who are not
experienced with fraud may be more susceptible to making errant attributions. Thus, we posit
that client likeability will be more likely to impact inexperienced auditors’ assessments of
evidence cues through the errant attribution of client likeability. We also expect this errant
attribution to be more prevalent in the evaluation of evidence cues that are related to the
characteristics or attitudes of the client (management characteristics) than for other types of
evidence cues. Formally stated:
H4: Errant attributions of client likeability are more likely to occur for evidence cues
concerning management characteristics than for evidence unrelated to management
characteristics, and this effect will be mitigated for auditors with fraud risk
assessment experience.
METHOD
Participants
The participants in this study included 140 audit professionals from staff to partner from
all of the Big 4 firms, another large international firm, and several regional firms located in two
cities representing the mountain west and southeast geographic areas of the United States. The
auditors were asked to voluntarily commit 30 minutes to complete a fraud likelihood judgment
task in mini-case format.
Procedure
The quasi-experiment was a 2x2x2 between-subjects design with two levels of affect
toward the client (like/dislike), two levels of accountability (low /high), and one measured
variable, experience assessing financial reporting fraud risk (no experience/experience). The
participants were asked to judge the likelihood of fraud for the company based on the
information presented.
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Partners of the contacted offices sent an email to audit professionals in their respective
office containing a request to participate in the study. The email included the purpose of the
study, the steps necessary to complete the study, the time commitment, and the voluntary nature
of participation. The email also contained a link to the research website. In addition, each
participant received a CD that contained the video portion of the study, which manipulated client
likeability. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental treatments of
accountability as they entered the case materials on the website. After reviewing the case, the
participants made an overall fraud judgment, completed their explanation requirement,
performed a distracter task, and completed an assessment of ten potential red flag cues. An
overview of the steps in the experiment is presented in Figure 1.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
Independent variables
Participants first viewed the video of a hypothetical client, who participants were told had
agreed to be taped for firm training purposes during the client acceptance interview. The client
acceptance setting was chosen to minimize the potential for participants to consider prior year
judgments made by firm colleagues. The client in both conditions expressed a desire to get the
audit change completed. The company background, such as industry classification, was omitted
to avoid a potential alternative explanation that auditors could systematically differ on the
judgment of a particular industry’s inherent risk4.

4

Because the case intentionally omitted many factors of client acceptance procedures that could inform a fraud
judgment, the introduction included the following statements, “You have been asked to assess the probability of
fraud based on limited information about the company. The case you are provided purposely omits information
related to client acceptance discussions of other members of the firm. You are being asked to consider the potential
for fraudulent financial reporting based on a taped interview by a colleague with the client’s controller/CFO. The
video was recorded during initial discussions of considering the engagement.”
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The video contained two segments. The first segment included the introduction of the
auditor to the client CFO, which contained the manipulation of client likeability.5 One group
viewed a pleasant, considerate, and interested client (likeable) while the other group viewed an
abrasive, rude/unpleasant, and inconsiderate client (dislikable). The second portion of the video
(consistent for all participants) portrayed the client answering the auditor’s questions. This
portion of the video contained the fraud cues (seven statements) adapted from Eining, Jones, and
Loebbecke (1997), which represented a moderate risk of fraud for the client. The moderate risk
case was selected to avoid floor or ceiling effects. The second segment was appended to each
version of the first segment to create the two video versions, which were randomly distributed to
the participants.
Accountability was manipulated between subjects, with one group being informed that
they would later be required to explain their fraud judgment and one group receiving no advance
instructions regarding the explanation requirement. Fraud experience was measured with a
dichotomous (yes/no) self-report of whether the auditor has ever been directly involved in
judging the likelihood that a firm has fraudulent financial reporting.
Dependent variable
After viewing the video, participants provided their overall fraud judgment on an elevenpoint fraud judgment scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton (1997). The scale endpoints were 1
(fraud extremely unlikely) and 11 (fraud extremely likely). Next, all participants provided an

5

The video was produced using a 50-year-old white male with management experience as the hypothetical
client’s CFO. Because of potentially lengthy download time related to the video, the video was burned onto
CDs for distribution to the participant pool. All other material, the introduction, overall judgment,
individual cues, manipulation check questions, and demographic questions were placed on a research web
site managed by the author.
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explanation for their judgment (recall that only the accountable group was informed that this
explanation would be required).
Fraud Evidence Statements
In an effort to provide information about the process by which affect influences fraud
judgments, participants were given ten additional independent statements made by the
hypothetical client. After recording their fraud judgment and completing a distractor task,
participants were asked to assess each additional statement on an 11-point scale of whether it
was (or was not) indicative of fraud. The statements were adapted from the 37 red-flag cue
examples in SAS 82 and SAS 99.6 Cues from Loebbecke et al. (1989), Hoffman and Patton
(1997) and Bell and Carcello (2000) were evaluated in developing the statements to present to
participants.7
Ten original red-flag fraud cues were selected and worded as a statement from the client
in this case. The negative wording of each statement was then positively worded to create ten
non red-flag statements. Each participant’s set of statements included five of the original red-flag
statements and five non red-flag statements. Two versions of the ten statements were created
such that the five red-flag (non red-flag) statements for half of the participants were the five non
red-flag (red flag) statements for the other half of the participants. The statements are presented
in Figure 2, and are categorized into statements relating to industry, management motivation,
management attitudes, operations, or external auditor relationship (two cues from each category).
<Insert Figure 2 here>

6

Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 82 provides five categories including management characteristics (attitude
and motivation), operating conditions, industry characteristics, and auditor relations (AICPA 1997). SAS 99
provides three categories based on the fraud triangle (pressure, opportunity and rationalization) developed to identify
characteristics of fraud perpetrators.
7
We gratefully acknowledge Vicky Hoffman’s willingness to share her experimental materials and notes on fraud
cues.
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Pretest
Several audit professors and several practicing auditors reviewed the materials. The
practicing auditors were from a variety of firms and represented different levels of experience
(staff, senior, and senior manager). The auditors unanimously agreed that the materials were of
similar quality to firm training materials, and that the video accurately portrayed a likeable and
dislikeable client similar to those they had encountered in practice. A pretest was conducted with
students enrolled in an auditing class who had already covered the standard on fraud. The student
participants completed the entire case for the non-accountable condition. The pretesting provided
evidence that the likeability manipulation was salient, but not overwhelming. The mean rating
for the dislikable client was 4.02 versus 5.52 for the dislikeable client on a scale from 1 (strong
dislike) to 9 (strong like). The pretest also supported that the case represented a moderate risk of
fraud, with participants rating the risk of fraud at a mean of 7.02 on a scale from 1 (fraud
extremely unlikely) to 11 (fraud extremely likely).
Because likeability is considered a central construct encompassing many psychological
constructs (Brewer and Crano 1994), the pretest asked participants to rate the confederate CFO
in the video on several personality characteristics. These included likeability (two questions),
competence, honesty, and cooperativeness. Of the five questions, only the two likeability and the
cooperativeness questions were significantly correlated to the assigned likeability condition. This
provides evidence that, although the confederate CFO differed in likeability across conditions, he
was not viewed differently in terms of honesty (means of 5.26 and 5.62 for dislike and like
conditions, respectively) or competency (means of 4.74 and 4.62 for dislike and like conditions,
respectively).
RESULTS
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Demographics
The participants in this study were professional auditors from international and regional
audit firms at levels from staff to partner.8 The participants’ fraud risk experience and rank
demographics are presented in Table 1. Of the 140 auditor participants, 80 reported no
experience, and 60 reported having experience assessing fraud in their professional duties. One
person with 6.5 years of experience who reported experience with fraud judgments did not report
his professional rank, and one staff level with no fraud judgment experience answered all
questions except the overall fraud judgment question.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Manipulation Checks
To evaluate the experimental manipulation of affect, auditor participants were asked
several questions related to the client in the video. Following the Regan et al. (1974) protocol,
two questions asked the participant to rate the client’s likeability from dislike to like and whether
the participant would like to work with the client. Both questions were scaled from 1 (strong
dislike) to 9 (strong like). The means for the two questions for the dislikeable and likeable
conditions were 3.44, 2.84, and 5.78, 5.50, respectively. Both manipulation check questions
indicate a significant effect of affect for the hypothetical client in the video (F = 139.258, p <
.001 and F = 137.198, p < .001 respectively). That is, when the hypothetical client appeared rude
(pleasant), the participants rated his likeability lower (higher) and would not (would) like to
work with the person in the video. Six participants’ perceptions were not consistent with the

8

Approval for the use of human subjects was granted from the IRB at the institution where the experiment took
place.
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intended manipulation. That is, five (one) participants in the likeable (dislikeable) condition rated
the CFO on the dislikable (likeable) end of the scale.9
Overall Judgment
After viewing the interview of the hypothetical client, participants made an overall initial
fraud judgment. An eleven-point fraud likelihood scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton (1997)
was used for the judgment. Recall that the case facts were intended to present a moderate risk of
fraud. The mean rating for fraud risk for all subjects was 7.73 suggesting the case elicited a
slightly higher than average risk of fraud.
The auditors’ overall fraud judgment was analyzed using a full factorial ANOVA, and the
results are presented in Table 2. The results indicate a three-way interaction between likeability,
experience and accountability (F = 2.869, p = .047); a two-way interaction of likeability and
experience (F = 4.183, p = .022); and a main effect of client likeability (F = 17.294, p < .001).
All p-values are one-tailed. To further explore the three-way interaction, specific simple main
effects were analyzed. These results along with the mean fraud judgment by condition are
reported in Table 3. The accountability manipulation did not reduce likeability for inexperienced
participants. These participants rated the fraud likelihood judgment higher (lower) for the
dislikeable (likeable) client in both the low-accountable and high-accountable conditions (t =
3.049, p < .01 and t = 3.377, p < .01 respectively). For the experienced auditors, accountability
mitigated the effect of likeability (low-accountable: t = 1.817, p = .040; high-accountable: t = 0.012, p = .495), partially supporting H2. In summary, the main effect results support hypothesis
one that client likeability does influence fraud judgments. However, it appears that task

9

The results are presented using all participants based on assigned likeability condition. An analysis without the six
participants results in a pattern of results that is consistent with the analysis presented in Table 3.
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experience alone is not sufficient to moderate its effects. Accountability in combination with task
experience eliminates the bias in judgment caused by client likeability.10
<Insert Table 2 here>
<Insert Table 3 here>
In the dislike (like) condition, the video included a statement by the client expressing
displeasure (pleasure) about the audit process. It is possible that this statement may have
influenced participants’ perceptions of management’s attitudes about internal controls or may
convey poor source reliability (i.e. signal that management may be trying to conceal a fraud).
This would be a relevant fraud risk factor as discussed under rationalization in SAS 99. SAS 99
describes rationalization as an “attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allows
management to knowingly and intentionally commit a dishonest act” (AU 316.07). The pretest
ratings of the case client on the characteristics of honesty and competency were not different
between the affect conditions, which provides evidence that the manipulation did not impact
participants’ perceptions of management as it relates to relevant fraud factors. Further, when
partners’ (all of whom had experience assessing fraud risk) judgments are examined
independently, likeability has no influence on fraud judgments, suggesting that experts did not
view the information in the dislike condition as relevant to the fraud assessment.11
Fraud Statement Assessments
In addition to examining whether client likeability impacts overall fraud judgments, we
also examine whether and how client likeability influences participants’ assessments of
10

As indicated in Table 1, the most variability in fraud experience existed among the senior and manager levels.
While the sample size is not large enough to examine the three-way interaction within this group, it should be noted
that there is an overall main effect of likeability within this group (like mean = 7.67 vs. dislike mean 8.39, p=.045,
two-tailed), indicating that general audit experience alone is not sufficient to eliminate the effect of likeability.
11

Seven partners, all with fraud assessment experience, judged the fraud risk to be similar regardless of the
likeability condition (like condition mean = 8.33 (n=3); dislike condition mean =8.0 (n=4)). This provides evidence
that there were no additional relevant fraud risk cues in the dislike manipulation.
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individual fraud evidence statements made by management. Recall that participants assessed ten
independent statements made by management (see Figure 2), which included five red-flag and
five non-red-flag statements. The shaded statements in Figure 2 comprise the ten statements used
in the primary analysis discussed and presented below. The non-shaded statements comprise
statement set version two, and produced similar results.12
A statistical comparison of means was used to test likeability’s impact on the statement
assessments for both the inexperienced and experienced auditors. For the inexperienced auditors,
results indicate that five of the ten statements are impacted by client likeability. Statements 3, 4,
5, 6, and 7 are statistically different for the likeable versus dislikeable client conditions.13
Statements 3, 4, 5, and 6 all refer to management characteristics, while statement 7 relates to an
operational characteristic. Conversely, for the experienced auditors there is no difference for nine
of the ten statements.14 The dislike condition resulted in a higher fraud rating than the like
condition (p = .065) for statement 8, a related party evidence cue. Table 4 presents the means for
the statement assessments across likeability condition and the corresponding t-test for the
inexperienced auditors only. The results provide support for Hypothesis 4. That is, client
likeability influences the assessments of evidence cues related to management characteristics for
inexperienced (but not experienced) auditors. Inexperienced auditors rate statements that
represent management characteristics as more indicative of fraud for the dislikeable client than
the likeable client. This provides evidence that, for inexperienced auditors, likeability impacts
overall fraud judgments partially through its impact on the assessment of statements made by

12

Because the negatively worded red-flag statement may not be completely parallel to its positively worded non-red
flag statement counterpart, the statement sets were analyzed separately. The primary analysis (version one) includes
45 inexperienced and 27 experienced auditors.
13
For version 2 (where red-flag and non-red flag statements were reversed), statement 5 was not significantly
different between conditions, and two statements were significantly different at p < .10.
14
For version 2, there is no significant effect of likeability on any of the ten statements.
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management. Since these ten statements were independent of (and assessed after) the fraud
judgment, we are not able to test for a mediating effect, but inexperienced auditors do appear to
exhibit attribution error of client likeability to evidence cues related to management
characteristics.
<Insert Table 4>
Of the five statements assessed by the inexperienced auditors differently for the likeable
versus dislikeable client, two statements were red-flag statements (statements 4 and 5), and three
were non-red-flag statements (statements 3, 6, and 7). Together, the results generally support the
prediction that client likeability impacts the statements referring to management characteristics,
regardless of whether or not the statement was a “red-flag” statement. Figure 3 presents a
graphical representation of the fraud evidence assessments between likeability conditions for
experienced and inexperienced auditors.
<Insert Figure 3>

CONCLUSIONS
As Bazerman et al. (2002) state: “We will need to embrace practices and regulations that
recognize the existence of bias and moderate its ill effects.” Affect is one area of bias where
there is still much to learn (Nelson and Tan 2005; Bhattacharjee and Moreno 2013). This
research provides evidence that affect influences overall fraud judgments, and that this effect
persists for auditors who are inexperienced with fraud judgments even when they are held
accountable. One explanation for this result is that experienced auditors who anticipate having to
explain their judgment have the requisite knowledge to enable systematic processing (system 2
thinking), which leads to the use of only relevant evidence in their judgments. These findings
support the profession’s use of accountability tools (requiring documentation/justification) to
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encourage effortful thought, but highlight the need for task-specific knowledge in fraud
judgments. The professional standards encourage brainstorming and group discussions in
discussions of fraud, which can provide a venue for experiential training for inexperienced
auditors to learn to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information in their judgment process.
This paper provides a first step to identifying the boundary conditions of the combination
of experience and accountability’s impact. Our paper supports the suggestion by Hammersley
(2011) that since fraud experience is highly varied among auditors, task experience is potentially
gained through firm training or fraud-related tasks, such as risk assessments. Future research
could investigate a larger set of mid-level experienced participants (i.e. seniors/managers) and
various training and practice factors that can improve fraud risk judgments to provide further
evidence.
This paper also provides insights into how affect toward the client biases the processing
of fraud cues for inexperienced auditors differently than experienced auditors. The results
demonstrate that the inclusion of client likeability may not transcend all evidence evaluation.
Client likeability impacts evidence statements that represent management characteristics, but it
does not influence the assessment of fraud cues related to industry characteristics, related party
transactions, or even past auditor relationships. This supports the notion that client likeability,
which is irrelevant in fraud judgments, is errantly attributed to certain cues that are relevant to a
fraud judgment. If the experiment had manipulated management’s honesty or integrity, it would
have been appropriate for participants to differentially assess fraud cues related to management.
However, the manipulation checks show that honesty, integrity, and competence were held
constant across likeability conditions. This result is particularly important given that
inexperienced auditor have significant interactions with audit clients. Bennett and Hatfield
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(2013) find that 86 percent of staff level auditors report interacting with client management three
or more days during a typical week of fieldwork, and senior and staff-level auditors reported
interacting with the client more than managers or partners. Further, prior research shows that
documentation by lower level staff has the potential to reduce the effectiveness of the subsequent
judgments of reviewers (Libby and Trotman 1993; Anderson and Koonce 1998; Agoglia, Brazel,
Hatfield 2009).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As with all experimental research, this paper may not generalize to other audit judgments,
such as internal control effectiveness and going concern judgments. It only addresses a fraud
judgment within a client acceptance procedure for a client with a moderate fraud risk. The
experimental design provided for the randomization of accountability and affect between
participants. However, experience with fraud was a measured variable. Thus, it is possible that
experience is correlated with an unmeasured variable (i.e. client size, industry). Specific details
about the client (i.e. industry) were intentionally not provided to mitigate these concerns.
Because this is an experimental setting, it is possible that other factors present in the audit
environment were omitted in the study that could impact the results. However, care was taken to
ensure the experimental materials represented the true audit environment, and discussions with
practicing auditors indicate that the scenario was realistic.
The results of this paper highlight the need for future research to investigate the impact of
client environmental factors to other areas of auditor judgment and for varying fraud risk clients.
Further, more research is needed on the types of evidence most likely to be impacted by client
characteristics, the importance of relevant versus irrelevant affect in judgment, and the
investigation of mechanisms and tools to improve auditor judgment. While this paper utilized
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example fraud cues from the professional standards, future research should investigate if
evidence can be better categorized to identify the specific characteristics of evidence that are
influenced by client likeability (i.e. objective versus subjective), to further refine when
inexperienced auditors might use errant attribution in their judgment process.
This paper characterizes client likeability as an irrelevant factor for the fraud judgment.
Bamber et al. (1997) find that auditors develop an “attitude toward the evidence” in the audit
process (Bamber et al. 1997); thus, emotion toward some evidence is appropriate. In gathering
evidence and formulating a fraud judgment, auditors must learn to appropriately utilize emotion
to accurately select and weight evidence in their judgment process. Future research could further
investigate how expert fraud examiners differentiate relevant and irrelevant emotion to assist the
training of inexperienced auditors. Other methods for improving inexperienced auditor judgment
include experiential training and electronic aids. Providing inexperienced auditors the knowledge
possessed by experienced auditors could improve their judgment (e.g., Carpenter, Durtschi, and
Gaynor 2006). Training material development would benefit from an examination of factors that
both should and should not be included (cue selection) in the judgment beyond guidance that is
provided by the current auditing standards. Electronic aids used as training tools and might also
improve the information used and weight allocated to auditor judgments, such as decision
support systems and expert systems (Eining et al. 1997, Bell and Carcello 2000). Future research
could investigate how affect impacts interactions in brainstorming sessions within the team.
Further, the effects of general affect (i.e. engagement team anxiety/stress from looming or prior
PCAOB inspections) versus targeted affect (i.e. affect toward the client) should be examined.
Finally, while the current paper examines the influence of the auditor’s affect toward the
client, it may be fruitful for future research to examine whether management’s affect toward the
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auditor is a relevant fraud signal that indicates an attempt to conceal fraud from the auditor. In
our case, the dislikeable client expressed displeasure with the audit process, but we find no
evidence that this was viewed as a relevant fraud cue. However, it is possible that a direct
manipulation of client affect toward the auditor might be a relevant fraud cue. We know of no
research that has examined this link. There are several anecdotal cases of clients with noteworthy
personalities (i.e. Jeff Skilling at Enron), which may influence how auditors assess fraud risk.
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FIGURE 1
Participant Steps in Experiment
1. Receive email from office partner requesting participation and CD (video) in office mail
folder
2. Open link to the research website and read an introduction to the study that includes the
purpose and a modified consent form.
3. Review hypothetical company and fraud likelihood scale example with explanation of
midpoint being average client for the audit firm.
4. Receive accountability treatment manipulation
5. Watch video of an interview with the client containing affect (likeability) manipulation
6. Make an overall likelihood judgment of fraud
7. Document reasons for their judgment
8. Complete distracter task: remove the CD and record the CD key number (to identify
likeable/dislikable group membership)
9. Make an assessment of ten additional CFO statements related to fraud likelihood.
10. Complete a demographic survey and manipulation check questions
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FIGURE 2
Independent Fraud Statements
“Red-Flag”

1

2

3
4

5

6

7

8

9
10

“Non- Red-Flag”

Industry Conditions
As you know, our industry is very
As you know, our industry is not very
competitive with fairly saturated product
competitive; our product markets are far from
markets. It’s so tough that we haven’t been
saturated. We’ve had no trouble maintaining our
able to maintain our profit margins over the profit margins over the last few years.
last few years.
The industry is changing so fast,
The industry doesn’t change very fast,
particularly product technology. We’ve had particularly product technology. We haven’t had
to handle a great deal of product
to deal with much product obsolescence.
obsolescence.
Management Motivation (Pressures)
Our new executive team tries to maintain
Our new executive team manages to maintain
our share price with some fairly aggressive
our share price without resorting to aggressive
accounting practices.
accounting practices.
Our new executive team gives analysts what
appear to be very optimistic forecasts.

Our new executive team gives analysts what
appear to be very achievable forecasts.

Management Attitudes
Because of budget constraints we continue
Since we don’t have tight budget constraints we
to struggle with the effectiveness of our IT
are quite happy with the effectiveness of our IT
system as well as our internal audit staff.
system and our internal audit staff.
In my view, the new executive team has not In my view, the new executive team has
communicated its vision in terms of values
communicated its vision in terms of values and
and ethics very effectively.
ethics very effectively.
Operating Conditions
We have barely managed to generate cash
We have easily managed to generate cash flows
flows from operations, while reporting
from operations, while reporting earnings
earnings growth.
growth.
The significant related-party transactions we We have not had any significant related-party
have are not in the ordinary course of
transactions in the ordinary course of business.
business.
External Auditor Relationship
I must admit that we did have some disputes I’m happy to say that we did not have any
with our previous auditor.
disputes with our previous auditor.
I don’t think that our previous auditor
I think that our previous auditor understood that
understood our need for a quick audit and
we didn’t need a quick audit and issuance of
issuance of their report.
their report.

NOTE: Participants viewed five red-flag and five non red-flag statements after their fraud judgment was recorded.
Two versions were created such that the five red-flag (non red-flag) statements for half of the participants were the
five non red-flag (red flag) statements for the other half of the participants. Shaded statements indicate the ten
statements used in version 1. The non-shaded statements were used in version 2.
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FIGURE 3
Panel A
No Experience with Fraud Judgment
Inexperienced Auditor Assessments
Individual "Non-Management" referenced
Statements

Inexperienced Auditor Assessments
Individual "Management" referenced
Statements
9.0

Fraud assessment

Fraud assessment

9.0

7.0

5.0

3.0
3

4

5
Statements

Dislike

7.0

5.0

3.0
1

6

2

Like

Statements 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer to management
characteristics (see Figure 2, version one), and each
assessment is significantly different based on the client
likeability condition (all p < .05). Statements 3 and 6 are
non-red-flag statements, and statements 4 and 5 are redflag statements. For version 2, there is no significant
difference for statement 5. All p-values are one-tailed.

7

8
Statements

Dislike

9

10

Like

For the non-management statements (1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and
10) five of the six assessments are not statistically
different based on the client likeability condition.
Statement 7 is an “operating” cue, and fraud is rated
statistically higher for a dislikeable client than a likeable
client. Statements 2, 7, and 10 are non-red-flag
statements, and statements 8 and 9 are red-flag
statements.

Panel B
Experience with Fraud Judgment
Experienced Auditor Assessments
Individual "Management" referenced
Statements

Experienced Auditor Assessments
Individual "Non-Management" referenced
Statements
9.0

Fraud assessment

Fraud assessment

9.0

7.0

5.0

3.0
3

4
Dislike

5
Statements

6
Like

7.0

5.0

3.0
1

2

7
Dislike

8
Statements

9

10

Like

For auditors with fraud judgment experience, there is no difference in the assessment of nine of the ten individual
statements based on client likeability in version 1. Likeability influenced the assessment of Statement 8, a related
party evidence cue (p = .065). There is no significant difference for any statement for the experienced auditors for
version 2 of the statements.
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Experience a

TABLE 1
Participant Task Experience by Professional Rank
Senior
Staff Senior Manager
Partner
Total
Manager

No

55

19

4

1

0

79

Yes

8
63

22
41

8
12

14
15

7
7

59
138 b

a

Self-reported experience of the auditor’s direct experience assessing the likelihood of fraud for an
audit client.
b
One participant with 6.5 years of experience (with fraud experience) did not provide professional
rank.
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TABLE 2
Univariate ANOVA of auditor’s overall judgment a
Source of variance
DF
Mean Square
F-value
Likeable (Like) c -H1
1
32.959
17.294
Accountability (Acct) d
1
.148
.078
Experience e
1
2.236
1.173
Acct * Like -H2
1
.369
.193
Experience * Like –H3
1
7.971
4.183
Acct * Experience
1
2.580
1.354
Like*Acct*Experience
1
5.468
2.869
Error
131
1.906

Sig.b
.000
.391
.141
.331
.022
.124
.047

a

The overall judgment is measured on an eleven-point fraud judgment scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton
(1997). Eleven indicates a high likelihood of fraud, and one indicates a low likelihood of fraud.
b
All statistical test significance values are one-tailed.
c
Client likeability (Like) is manipulated through a video recording of the auditor-client introduction, with the
client represented as likeable or not likeable.
d
Accountability is manipulated through a forewarning of a required post-judgment explanation (high accountable)
or by omitting this instruction (low accountable).
e
Experience is a self-report measure of the auditor’s experience with making a fraud risk judgment in their
professional duties.

36

TABLE 3
Fraud Judgment by Experience, Accountability and Likeability
Fraud Judgment a
Std. Dev.
n
Client Likeability b
Experience c
Accountability d
Like
Dislike
Difference t-value
7.16
8.33
1.17
3.049
Low
1.50
0.80
19
21
Inexperienced
6.65
8.42
1.77
3.377
High
1.95
1.22
20
19
7.22
8.23
1.01
1.817
Low
1.48
1.59
18
13
Experienced
8.07
8.07
0.00
-0.012
0.92
1.16
High
14
15

Sig. e
003*

.001*

.040*

.495

a

The overall fraud judgment is measured on an eleven-point scale adapted from Hoffman and Patton (1997).
Eleven indicates a high likelihood of fraud, and one indicates a low likelihood of fraud.
b
Client likeability is manipulated through a video recording of the auditor-client introduction, with the client
represented as likeable (Like) or not likeable (Dislike).
c
Experience is a self-report measure of the auditor’s experience with making a fraud risk judgment in their
professional duties.
d
Accountability is manipulated through a forewarning of a required post-judgment explanation (high accountable)
or by omitting this instruction (low accountable).
e
All statistical test significance values are one-tailed. The “*” indicates a statistically significant difference
between groups in the predicted direction.
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TABLE 4
Fraud Statement Assessments for Inexperienced Auditors a
Statement b
Client likeability
N
Mean
t
Significance
Dislike
19
8.47
1c
0.218
p = .829
Like
26
8.38
Dislike
19
5.05
2
0.954
p = .345
Like
26
4.62
Dislike
19
7.74
3
3.287
p = .002
Like
26
5.65
Dislike
19
8.89
4c
3.331
p = .002
Like
26
7.42
Dislike
19
8.58
5c
2.403
p = .021
Like
26
7.50
Dislike
19
5.00
6
2.465
p = .018
Like
26
3.73
Dislike
19
6.53
7
1.993
p = .053
Like
26
5.27
Dislike
19
8.11
8c
-1.063
p = .294
Like
26
8.65
Dislike
19
8.68
9c
0.353
p = .726
Like
26
8.54
Dislike
19
5.89
10
-.062
p = .951
Like
26
5.92

d

d

d

d

a

Results represent the fraud assessments of inexperienced auditors who received version one (See
Figure 2) of the evidence cues. Version two produced similar results.
b
Statements 1-10 represent five red-flag and five non-red-flag statements. Each statement matches
the respective shaded statements (version 1) in Figure 2. Participants rated each statement on a
scale from one (fraud less likely) to 11 (fraud more likely).
c
Represent red-flag statements, all other statements are non-red-flag statements.
d
Statements refer to management characteristics (motivation or attitudes).
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